

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**ARE WE MEETING THE INTENT OF THE SKELTON AND CHENEY PANELS AS IT RELATES TO
JOINT PROFICIENCY TRAINING FOR OUR STRATEGIC LEADERS IN THE 21ST CENTURY?**

by

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ABSTRACT

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Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has directed a transformation of the Armed Services. He has stated that a transformation requires a changed mindset as much as it requires innovation and technology. Since the end of World War II, when the National Security Act of 1947 created the Secretary and Department of Defense and established the Joint Staff, the services have been obligated to train more joint-minded officers. Thus the establishment of several schools to provide this Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) was created. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 established the selection, education, assignment, and promotion criteria for a Joint Officer Personnel Policy. The Skelton Panel of 1988 conducted the first Congressional review afterwards of the Professional Military Education System and recommended several areas for needed improvement. Additionally, the 1997 Cheney Panel determined that the joint instruction should begin earlier in the JPME process at the point of pre-commissioning and that the curriculum should be deepened and expanded at each consecutive level. The panel also determined that the Senior Service College should focus joint operations and multinational warfare. This paper seeks to determine if the senior level colleges, as they exist today, are meeting the recommendations of the Skelton and Cheney panels. The first section of this paper will identify the colleges charged to educate the senior leaders and examine the composition of the student body and its faculty followed by an examination of the curriculum of each school. And finally, the paper will also look into possible areas where efficiencies can be gained, specifically as associated with costs savings and potential duplication reduction efforts. Are these colleges truly focusing on the "joint" aspect sufficiently enough to shape and modify individual service biases? Should there be a change to the current system to change the required mindset of the future strategic leader expectations for the 21st Century?

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ARE WE MEETING THE INTENT OF THE SKELTON AND CHENEY PANELS AS IT RELATES TO JOINT PROFICIENCY TRAINING FOR OUR STRATEGIC LEADERS IN THE 21ST CENTURY?

Eisenhower got it right more than 30 years ago, when in a message to Congress, he noted, "Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all Services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparation and organizational activity must conform to this fact.

—Congressman Ike Skelton, 1997

Educating and grooming a more seasoned Joint Staff Officer within the military structure, are we successfully achieving the goals as set forth in Title IV, Joint Officer Personnel Policy, of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986? The law addresses education, management, and promotion policies for Joint Staff Officers. This paper will only address the education portion of the law as it applies to the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) program. Congressman Skelton led the efforts of the 1988 review panel, which looked at the military's joint education program at the command and staff college level. His panel found the professional military education program to be sound and in general compliance with the Goldwater-Nichols Act but needing improvements. Each service was operating independently. The 1989 final report recommended a number of changes to encourage the Armed Forces to focus more "Jointly". Numerous panels have reviewed the program over the years to ensure that the provisions of the law are met within the intent set by Congress originally. Significant improvements have been made over the years, however there remains room for more. The 1997 Center for Strategic Studies Report on Professional Military Education (PME), chaired by now Vice-President Cheney, recommends that the JPME process begins at the point of pre-commissioning and that it be deepened and expanded at each level of training and education. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has directed a transformation of the Armed Services. His focus is on personnel as much as it is on technology and equipment. With a numerical cap on force structure, the transformation of the armed services will require more sophisticated joint service training and exercise program to synchronize and execute operations in support of national strategy. This paper focuses on the Senior Level Colleges as an area where JPME efficiencies can be made and officers can gain from a transformational approach to education.

BACKGROUND

There are twenty different military schools (not including any pre-commissioning sources), resident and non-resident, which provide primary, intermediate, or senior level JPME requirements. Of these, six are senior level colleges that produce qualified service specific military strategists, joint strategists, or national security strategists. The schools are divided into two categories, separate service senior level colleges and joint service senior level colleges. Their source of origination and mission are described below.

SEPARATE SERVICE SENIOR LEVEL COLLEGES

The Navy was the first service to establish a senior level school. Former Secretary of the Navy, William E. Chandler established the Naval War College (NWC) on 6 October 1884 via General Order 325.¹ “It is the oldest continuing institution of its kind in the world.”² Its stated mission is “to enhance the professional capabilities of students to make sound decisions in the highest command and management positions and to conduct research leading to the development of advanced strategic and tactical concepts for the future employment of naval forces.”³ The NWC is the proponent for focusing on “Sea Power.”

The Army was the second service to establish a war college. Former Secretary of War, Elihu Root, founded the Army War College (AWC) institution in 1901. The college’s traditions and principles remain the same as stated by Secretary Root: “Not to promote war, but to preserve peace by intelligent and adequate preparation to repel aggression. Root envisioned a place where senior leaders would study and confer on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.”⁴ Its educational mission is “to prepare selected military, civilian, and international leaders to assume strategic leadership responsibilities in military and national security organizations, and to educate students about the employment of the U.S. Army as a part of a unified, joint, or multinational force in support of the national military strategy.”⁵ The AWC is the proponent for focusing on “Land Power.”

The Air Force established its war college in 1946 after World War II. All services placed a greater emphasis on education as well as a directed emphasis on joint operations. The Air Force mission is to “educate the senior officers to lead at the strategic level in the employment of air and space forces, including joint, combined, and coalition operations, in support of national security.”⁶ The Air War College is the proponent for focusing on “Air Power.”

The Marine Corps established its war college (MCWC) in 1990. A much smaller effort with only 12 to 15 students; its mission is “to educate selected senior officers and civilians for decision-making during war and military operations other than war in a joint, interagency, and

multinational environment. MCWC graduates are prepared to assume senior leadership positions of increasing complexity through the study of national military strategy, theater strategy and plans, and military support to those strategies within the context of national security policies, decision-making, objectives, and resources.⁷

JOINT SENIOR LEVEL COLLEGES

Both joint senior level colleges were established after World War II. In 1946 the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) became the primary schools to bring the services together in joint operational studies. A year later the National Security Act of 1947 reinforced their priority. This act also established another alternative for joint training at the intermediate or senior level, the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC).

The mission of the National War College is “to train select personnel on the political-military aspects of Defense policies and programs in support of the national security strategy. Its focus is on the art and science of developing, applying and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security.”⁸ Graduates are trained as national security strategists.

The ICAF mission is “to prepare selected military officers and civilians for senior leadership and staff positions by conducting postgraduate, executive-level courses of study and associated research dealing with national security strategy and the resource component of national power, with special emphasis on acquisition and joint logistics, and their integration into national security strategy for peace and war.”⁹ Graduates are trained as national security and defense and material management strategists.

PROVISIONS OF THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT TITLE IV

In 1985 the Senate Armed Services Committee's (SASC) study of the Joint Staff and Joint duty billets across the services revealed that the quality of military personnel assigned to joint duty was inadequate. “Recommendations were made to (1) improve the education and experience levels of military personnel serving in these assignments, (2) improve the personnel management of trained officers serving in joint billets, and (3) change promotion policies to encourage quality military personnel to take interest in joint assignments as beneficial career move.”¹⁰

In 1986 the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) identified almost identical shortcomings and described “the overall joint organizational structure as weak and the

personnel management system as unsatisfactory. There was a complete failure to fill joint positions with officers who had the requisite talent, education, training, and experience.¹¹

The 1986 Panel Members made recommendations with the stated belief that "U.S. strategy is too important to leave to chance".¹² Recognizing that the formulation of a national strategy is essentially a political process, the panel nonetheless believed that:

1. Well-educated military officers who can think strategically have an important contribution to make to the development of strategy.
2. There is an overwhelming need for the military education system to improve its contribution to strategic thinking.¹³

The panel, by its emphasis on strategy, "intended to underscore the fact that the development of officers who can think strategically is as vital important to U.S. security as effective weapons systems and adequate supplies of munitions."¹⁴

The panel determined that "service interests, unleavened by a larger perspective, have tended to dominate the development of U.S. military policy."¹⁵ A major objective of the panel was to encourage a larger perspective. Strengthening joint institutions and joint military advice in contrast to narrower service viewpoints was closely related to the panel's focus on how well the JPME system encouraged military officers to think strategically.

"The panel's final assessment was that with few exceptions, military officers had been absent from the ranks of prominent post-World War II strategic thinkers."¹⁶

To support this finding, the panel began with a working definition of strategic analysts attributes. These attributes are demonstrated in an analytical thought process, healthy pragmatism, creating innovative solutions and concepts, and a broad education. These attributes as described by the panel are:

Analytical. He/she must be able to move beyond isolated facts or competency in any given subject area to see and develop interrelationships.

Pragmatic. The accelerated pace of change in today's world, especially technological change, is self-evident. A strategist must be on top of emerging trends and aware of the need to constantly revalidate his/her strategic constructs.

Innovative. Developing strategies is a creative process and one must frequently challenge status quo.

Broadly Educated. Thinking strategically requires individuals who are generalists rather than specialists. Many different subjects impact strategic thinking –domestic and international trends in political, technological, economic, scientific, and social issues. Strategist's education must be the broadest possible.¹⁷

POLICY PROVISIONS

Goldwater-Nichols established on two Joint Officer policy provisions that specifically apply to education. “The first is to establish an occupational category to manage the career development of officers who are trained in and oriented toward joint military and national security matters. Secondly, services shall require that Joint Specialty Officers (JSOs) complete a joint education program and a full joint assignment tour of 24 to 36 months.”¹⁸ Few waiver categories for modifying the training or shortening the tour length are authorized, yet the services still encounter challenges to achieve both criteria for promising officers. The other provisions directed by the study address designated JSO billets, assignment criteria, promotion standards, and tour lengths and do not apply to the scope of this paper.

EDUCATIONAL BUILDING BLOCKS

After defining a strategist and determining the need for a better education to groom a quality national strategist, the panel identified three educational building blocks to achieve this required level of training. “First, the officers must have firm grasp of his/her own service, sister services, and joint commands. Secondly, officers must have a clear understanding of tactics and operational art. Third, the officer must understand the relationship between the disciplines of history, international relations, political science, and economics.”¹⁹ All three components of developing a strategist must be achieved to build competent, experienced officers who are national military strategist capable of supporting and advising the President/ Commander in Chief.

A variety of study options are available to reach individual requirements and goals. Studies may be conducted at either civilian graduate schools or military education and research programs. Military programs such as the Army’s Strategic Studies Institute, the Navy’s Strategic Studies Group and the National Defense University’s (NDU) Strategic Concepts Development Center, the Naval Postgraduate School or the Air Force Institute of Technology offer a wide spectrum of possibilities.

Looking deeper into each program, the panel determined that there was not sufficient focus in the curricula of the military schools and recommended focus as follows:

1. Capstone Program (for general officers) – Add a focus on Strategy
2. National War College – National Security Strategy
3. ICAF – Balance National Military and National Security Strategies
4. Service War Colleges – National Military Strategy

Intermediate Schools would continue to focus on operational art with and introduction to military strategy.²⁰

The panel was compelled to re-emphasize focus because the services had opted to follow their own path for educating officers. The three tables below, depict the quick progression by the services to treat schools as co-equal instead of building blocks of education. As established in 1946, the education path was a progressive one that built on Basic Service Schools and was followed by Intermediate Schools. This was immediately followed by the AFSC and a joint duty tour. The Senior Service College followed a joint assignment. A select few of these officers would receive a second year of training and studies at either National War College or ICAF.

PME 1946			
ICAF	NWC		
AFSC			
AIR CGSC	ARMY CGSC	MARINE CGSC	NAVY CGSC
AIR SQN SCHOOL	USA BRANCH SCH	USMC AMPHIB SCH	USN SCH (AIR,SUB,SUR)

TABLE 1: PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION 1946²¹

By 1950, a short four years later, officers received their educations in service specific schools the same as they did previously. Designated, as opposed to all, graduates of the intermediate schools attended the AFSC in route to a joint assignment. In practice, the ICAF came into use as an educational equivalent to the service war colleges. The National War College remained to be a second year of senior level education for successful Colonels and Navy Captains with futures as national strategists.

PME 1950			
NWC			
ICAF	AIR WAR COL	AWC	COL OF NAVAL WARFARE
AFSC			
AIR CGSC	ARMY CGSC	MARINE CGSC	NAVY CGSC
AIR SQN SCH	USA BRANCH SCH	USMC AMPHIB SCH	USN SCH (AIR,SUB,SUR)

TABLE 2: PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION 1950²²

By 1963 few officers attended both a service war college (ICAF included) and the National War College. The services claimed time was too precious to allow their officers two years of dedicated studies. In approximately 1968, the Army and Air Force stopped sending

their officers to the AFSC after their service staff college. This additional omission in career officer education continues to be a source of frustration today. As stated in the December 2002 GAO report, “In fiscal year 2001, only one-third of the officers who were serving in joint organizations had completed both phases of the education.”²³ It is so much a frustration that the “Joint Staff will not release officers during a three-year tour to attend this training.”²⁴ The three-month class must be completed prior to arrival at the joint duty station.

PME 1950 TO	PRESENT	(*Note: USMC	WC added in	1990)
NWC	ICAF	AIR WAR COL	AWC	National WC
	AIR CGSC	ARMY CGSC	MARINE CGSC	NAVY CGSC
	AIR SQN SCH	USA BR SCH	USMC AMPHIB	USN SCH

TABLE 3: PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION 1960-PRESENT²⁵

Currently, the requirement for all officers to have a joint education from a service perspective is now taught in the Service Intermediate Schools (staff colleges) and JPME Phase I. Phase I JPME is taught again at the Service War Colleges. Phase II is taught at the AFSC either after a Service Staff College or Service War College. Others may skip the AFSC and attend the National War College or the ICAF. These schools address Phase II and enhance joint education with rigorous standards from a truly joint perspective.

Prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act the Department of Defense Committee on Excellence in Education, June 1975, determined that to justify five separate senior colleges that each service should have a “mission field.”²⁶ The curriculum was to have three components: a common core, mission specific courses, and an elective program tailored to student needs. Each college’s mission was refined – the AWC was to focus on land warfare; the NWC on naval warfare; the Air War College on aerospace warfare; ICAF on defense management and material management; and the National War College on national security policy.

“The Goldwater-Nichols Act established statutory requirements for performance of officers in joint assignments and required personnel management policies to meet three goals:

1. Quality. Select more talented officers for the joint duty assignments. To achieve quality, goals were established for the joint duty officer program. Goldwater-Nichols re-emphasized the Secretary of Defense previously established requirements, promotion rates for JSOs, established total numbers of JSO identified billets per joint assignment, and made joint duty a requirement for selection to general officer.

2. Experience. Increase the joint experience level for officers in joint duty assignments.

To fulfill this experience goal, officers were required, by law, to complete a full joint tour to be considered for JSO status. To this end, “critical” billets were identified on joint assignments that “must” be filled with a JSO who had completed at least one previous tour.

3. Educate. Educate officers for joint duty assignments appropriately. Education goals were achieved by strengthening the joint education for “all” officers, emplaced a prerequisite that the joint educational training be completed prior to serving the joint assignment, and required all new flag and general officers to attend a “Capstone” course “to prepare them to work with other services.”²⁷

In summary, the Goldwater-Nichols panel believed, as it was pointed out by former Chief of Naval Operations, that “the ultimate joint specialist will be a joint task force commander or commander of a unified command. The joint specialist is not just a joint “staff” officer.”²⁸

Although the law leaves room for a diverse mix of officers to become JSOs and serve in joint assignments, “it clearly intends that the future combat leaders of the armed forces will be drawn from the joint specialty.”²⁹

SKELTON PANEL

The Skelton Panel was directed to review the DoD plan to implement JPME requirements per the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. The panel was charged to assess DoD’s ability to develop a professional military strategist, joint warfighters, and tacticians. Generally the DoD PME was sound, but the panel made several recommendations for improvement for joint issues.

Congress intended that JSOs be in the top element of their peer group and experienced in joint assignments. Former Deputy Commander in Chief of European Command, General W.Y. Smith, USAF (RET) suggested and the panel adopted that a JSO “has an in-depth, expert knowledge of their own service, some knowledge of other services, experience operating with other services, and mutual trust and confidence in the other services.”³⁰ To this end the JSO must view all services from a higher vantage point. They must reject approaches that always favor their own service, and seeking innovative and creative ways to employ a wider spectrum of force options. They must make a commitment to develop and implement policies, procedures, and practices that will make multi-service joint operations the norm rather than the exception. To better implement the JPME program, the Skelton Panel established criteria for the substance, perspective, and environment for JPME to be most effective. Additionally, the panel determined who would control the overall program and each institution.

SUBSTANCE OF JOINT EDUCATION

“Building on the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Skelton Panel identified three substantive elements of the joint education process upon which to focus. For the purpose of focusing joint education, the Skelton Panel determined “joint matters” to include:

1. The elements contained in the Goldwater-Nichols Act
 - a. Integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces.
 - b. National military strategy.
 - c. Strategic planning.
 - d. Contingency planning.
 - e. Command and control of combat operations under unified command.
2. Several other subjects subsumed in the elements contained in the Goldwater-Nichols Act definition.
 - a. Joint and combined operations.
 - b. Joint doctrine.
 - c. Joint logistics.
 - d. Joint communications.
 - e. Joint intelligence.
 - f. Theater/campaign planning.
 - g. Joint military command and control systems and their interfaces with national command systems.
3. Joint force development, including certain military aspects of mobilization.³¹

PERSPECTIVE FOR JOINT EDUCATION

With the substance of joint education agreed upon, the Skelton Panel established that schools should “teach joint curricula from the perspectives of a commander of a unified command and a contingency joint task force commander at the three-star level.”³²

ENVIRONMENT FOR JOINT EDUCATION

All joint educational schools should be multi-service in student body and faculty. According to an Armed Services Congressional Committee Panel, for a school (National War College, ICAF, AFSC) educating the Joint Specialist or JSO, “the standard student body should be equal representation from each service department. This equated to a one third mix each of Army, Air, and Navy. For all other schools (Air Force, Army, Marine, and Navy War Colleges) teaching all other officers about joint matters, the representation should be a mix of 50 percent from the host military department and 25 percent from each other military department for each

different school respectively. “The faculty should be diverse as well. It should be reflective of the student body it is charged to teach in equal percentages. The panel believed that an advanced civilian degree should be a prerequisite for assignment to a teaching position. Prior joint duty experience by every joint faculty member should be a goal as well.”³³ This remains a goal today.

CONTROL OF JOINT EDUCATION

Goldwater-Nichols and the panel determined that control of each service school should remain under the direction of its respective military department secretary and specifically the service chief. Joint education and training is assigned to the Secretary of Defense and he receives advice and assistance from the Chairman, JCS.

CHENEY PANEL

While serving as the Chair of the Study Group on Professional Military Education 1997, former White House Chief of Staff and now Vice President Dick Cheney and other distinguished professionals conducted a study of the professional military education system for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIC). Their charter was “to assess where professional military education has been in the past, where it is now, and where it should be in the future.”³⁴ To ensure integrity and credibility of the report the career military members were kept in the minority. The Department of Defense presides over the largest and most expensive educational system in the world. Some argue that it should be eliminated or at the least undergo dramatic changes and reductions. However, the study group determined that the only thing the U.S. did right in the disarmament years of the 1920s and 1930s was to maintain and even enhance its military educational institutions. Examples of the fruits of the military education efforts are cited in Dwight D. Eisenhower, Douglas A. MacArthur, George C. Marshall, George Patton, Hap Arnold, and Hoyt Vandenberg.”³⁵

“Since the Cold War, the U.S. deployment rate has increased by 300 percent. In 1996 alone, the nation deployed forces to operations in Bosnia, Haiti, Kuwait, Macedonia, Palestine, the Sinai, Turkey, the Western Sahara, northern Iraq, and the Taiwan Straits. Operations spanned the spectrum from disaster relief and peacekeeping to deadly combat.”³⁶ This operational tempo continues to influence our future operations. “DOD Joint Vision 2020 portrays a future in which the armed forces are fully joint: intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and technically. To exploit emerging technologies and to respond

to diverse threats and new enemy capabilities requires increasing agile, flexible, and responsive organizations.³⁷

FINDINGS

The panel addresses specific areas in which the “PME system must improve to meet rapidly evolving challenges.”³⁸ The Panel also stated that “the PME institutions have made great progress since the 1989 Skelton Panel reforms, and that more can be done to promote a truly joint service culture.”³⁹ The Cheney panel determined the following findings and conclusions:

“There is a need to maintain a robust professional military education system. Our PME institutions have served as great engines of change for the military. They have molded and mentored the future leaders who went on to reshape vast military organizations and their operations. Through the rapid and most profound draw down and consolidation of the post-Cold War all-volunteer force, the revolution in military affairs brought by the Information Age, and the increasing demands that straddle the worlds of business, technology, politics, and the “Battlefield,” the PME provide substantive responses throughout the spectrum of management, leadership, and ethical systems principles and applications.”⁴⁰

“Continue to fund the PME system as a high priority in defense spending. Expand the PME to reach more officers, especially at the intermediate and senior PME levels. Expand correspondence courses and distance learning to better prepare officers more thoroughly for new and different threats.”⁴¹

“The PME process begins at pre-commissioning institutions, Officer Candidate School, Reserve Officer Training Corps, and the service academies.”⁴² There were several recommendations for improvement at this level but one focused on “Joint” instruction. All institutions are to incorporate mandatory courses introducing students to the operations and culture of their sister services and stressing the point that most, if not all, future military operations should and must be joint. “They also recommend that the service academies implement a program that would ensure each midshipman and cadet spend at least a full semester at another service academy during his or her four-year preparation.”⁴³

“Intermediate level PME will deepen and expand the joint curriculum. It is imperative to instill a joint culture at every level of PME instruction.”⁴⁴ This level should become the primary source of comprehensive joint military education.

“Senior level PME focuses on joint operations and multinational warfare and incorporated the role of the military as one instrument of national security on an agenda that includes

political, diplomatic, economic, and intelligence interests of the U.S.. The panel recommends that DoD establish a senior level Interagency National Security Studies Program for selected Flag/General Officers and civilian leaders.⁴⁵ (Note: What the National War College was originally intended to do. –My opinion) This would be above and beyond the current Capstone Program.

The PME system must build on the foundation laid by pre-commissioning institutions on morality and ethics. “Establish guidelines for a comprehensive, sequential program of mandatory ethics instruction at each level of PME. Free societies grant no greater trust than the authority to wield deadly force on a massive scale. The military demands devotion to a clear hierarchy ruled by a strict chain of command; a willingness to place concern for self below loyalty to the Constitution and the Group; and the courage to lead others and oneself into harm’s way.”⁴⁶ This is an enormous responsibility that should be imbedded in every officer’s psyche to be revisited at each level of higher public trust and responsibility.

“Focus more on JPME earlier in an officer’s development. Unity of command in a joint and multinational environment is key. Coaxing coordinated efforts out of the four separate armed services with different cultures and command structures has been a challenge for U.S. leaders. To strengthen service interoperability and commitment to joint operations, Congress mandated in Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1989 that joint staffs be filled with quality officers. It also made a joint assignment mandatory to make flag or general officer ranks. The Cheney panel wants to take an additional step and make intermediate level command and general staff colleges the educational prerequisite for designation as a joint specialty officer nominee.”⁴⁷ (Note: This is a return to the 1950 to 1960 decade of educating joint staff officers.)

Unlike the past when the U.S. enjoyed technological superiority and formulated doctrine and strategies accordingly, the military is now driven by “commercial developments that are changing at an unprecedented rate. The Information Age is transforming both domestic and global economies and American competitiveness. The impact on DoD is equally profound and revolutionizing military affairs. The war colleges must adapt to the demands of new technologies that are synergistic only when combined in a relatively seamless, joint environment in which the capabilities of each service’s platforms complement on another and add to a commander’s vision of the battlefield. This will require an officer who is more versed in the C4I capabilities of their sister services. The PME must produce officers who have both the mental acuity to exercise sound judgment in response to ever-shifting situations and a sufficient grounding in the sciences to allow them to exploit advanced technologies.”⁴⁸

DIRECTIVES

To this end the PME will:

- a. Ensure that the Services maintain a sufficient flow of officers grounded in the applied sciences, math, and engineering.
- b. Establish technological core competencies that should be taught at each PME level.
- c. Improve instruction in the Joint command and control “system of systems” at the intermediate and senior level colleges.
- d. Electronically network the various PME institutions for greater “cross-talk” and collaboration. (Funny I have been asking this all year. Why can’t we VTC with our sister war colleges on key subjects and guest speakers? The rooms are equipped but we do not communicate with our sister service schools.)
- e. Strengthen educational instructions and officer preparations for operations other than war -- now called Lesser Contingencies.⁴⁹

“The panel determined that the idea to consolidate the war colleges missed the point. The senior service colleges also serve as critical research laboratories and archives of specialized knowledge and core competitiveness for their respective services. Examples are the Strategic Studies Institute, which conducts regular analyses of innovative warfighting concepts; the Center for Naval Warfare Studies which offers the Global Game series; and the College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, which looks at new theories in the application of air power. In addition, the panel recommended to continue with the Capstone program and the Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course.”⁵⁰ And finally, the panel recommended to “establish a senior level, interagency national security studies program for selected flag and general officers and government civilian leaders.”⁵¹

As early as 1901 former Secretary of War Elihu Root urges the service representatives at the dedication of the U.S. AWC at Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. to “Never forget your duty of coordination. ...This is the time to learn to serve together without friction.”⁵² This line of thought is reinforced in the Skelton Panel reforms focused to create joint specialty officers fully versed in the intricacies of joint operations and reiterated by the Chaney Panel.

CJCS CURRENT JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

The Joint Chief of Staff in the CJCSI 1800.01A dated 01 December 2000, specifies the JPME requirements. This document applies to the Joint Staff, NDU, and the Military Services. “It charges the US military to channel the vitality and innovation of its people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting.”⁵³ It

details specific requirements for each school to achieve in its curriculum. The basic joint learning areas and objectives are listed below.

SENIOR SERVICE LEVEL COLLEGES

The Service Senior Level College joint learning areas and objectives are:

1. National Security Strategy – Analyze the strategic art and comprehend how national policy is turned into executable military strategies. Analyze how the constituent elements of government influence the national security process.
2. National Planning Systems and Processes – Comprehend the Department of Defense systems and analyze the elements that impact on the planning process. Analyze joint and operational planning processes and comprehend the role of joint doctrine in the combatant command.
3. National Military Strategy and Organization – Comprehend the art and science of using military resources with other elements of national power to attain national security objectives. Understand the roles and relationships of interagency operations and the impact on developing a national military strategy.
4. Theater Strategy and Campaigning – Comprehend joint, unified, and multinational campaigns in support of the combatant commander and analyze joint operational art, especially as it applies to the joint task force.
5. Information Operations and Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4) - Understand the basic concepts and demonstrate their use in support of national military and security strategies. Demonstrate IO and C4I use in the theater and strategic campaign development process.
6. The Role of Technology in 21st Century Warfare – Comprehend how technological change affects the art and science of war and analyze Joint Vision 2010.⁵⁴

NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

The National War College Joint learning areas and objectives are:

1. National Security Strategy – Analyze the interrelationships among ends, ways, and means and apply the analytical frameworks to the formulation and evaluation of the national security strategy and develop new ones for implementation guidance.

2. Geo-Strategic Context – Comprehend the major contributing issues that impact selected states and regions and the roles and influences of international organizations and non-state actors in them. Evaluate key military, non-military, and transnational challenges to the US. Conduct strategic assessments.
3. Instruments of National Power – Comprehend the fundamental elements of national power. Investigate concepts and approaches for the DIME in support of national security strategy and evaluate their employment.
4. National Security Policy Process – Comprehend the foundations of the national security establishment and the responsibilities of the National Security Council system. Analyze the major government and non-government institutions used to influence and implement national security policy and strategy.
5. National Military Strategy – Analyze the nature of war, apply classical theories to strategic challenges and comprehend the key considerations that shape national military strategy. Develop a national military strategy.⁵⁵

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

The Industrial College of the Armed Forces joint learning areas and objectives are:

1. National Security Strategy – Evaluate the enduring philosophical and historical American principles, the foundations of democratic government, and the nature of the ever-changing domestic and international security environments. Apply historical lessons learned, conduct strategic assessments, and evaluate the US capabilities and vulnerabilities of US industry and defense materiel acquisition policies.
2. National Planning Systems and Processes – Analyze the national security decision-making system and the policy formulation process and the responsibilities of the interagency and joint community. Analyze the national economy and the technological means that can lead to a competitive advantage.
3. National Military Strategy and Organization – Formulate national military strategies and analyze the concepts of the strategic decision-making process and defense planning process. Apply the principles of joint military doctrine and analyze the resources needed for US military capabilities.
4. Theater Strategy and Campaigning – Assess joint and multinational campaigns in support of national objectives. Formulate joint theater strategies.

5. Strategic Leader Development – Analyze and evaluate strategic leadership competencies and techniques for leading strategic change. Develop and evaluate leadership and organizational skills to create innovative, agile, robust organizations capable of operating ethically and effectively.⁵⁶

SUMMARY OF CJCSI 1800.01A JPME REQUIREMENTS

	SERVICES	NATIONAL	ICAF
National Security Strategy	X	X	X
Nat'l Planning System & Processes	X		X
Nat'l Military Strategy & Organization	X	X	X
Theater Strategy & Campaign	X		X
C4I	X		
Role of Technology	X		
Geo-Strategic Context		X	
Instruments of National Power		X	
National Security Policy Process		X	
Strategic Leader Development			X

TABLE 4: SUMMARY OF LEARNING AREAS

As the chart above depicts, only the Senior Service Schools and the ICAF share a similar core of educational learning areas. They share only two similar learning areas with the National War College. This highlights the original focus as directed by the National Security Act of 1947 for the National War College to be focused on National Strategy. However, our services use the NWC as a substitute for the Senior Service School. Our officers are not obtaining the same level of service or joint training if they attend NWC in lieu of a Service School.

While the ICAF shares four areas with the Services, it is required to learn to a much deeper level than the Services. ICAF students will analyze, evaluate, apply, formulate, and develop. The Services are only required to analyze, understand, and comprehend. There is no required application to formulate or develop. At best they will demonstrate an understanding of integrating IO and C4I.

The National War College also differs from the Services in the scope and depth of studies. The students will analyze, comprehend, evaluate, and develop the areas of concentration they study. These verbs in the CJCS directive imply students will gain a deeper understanding of the components and processes of National Security Strategy.

TRANSFORMATION

Transformation initiatives within DoD will impact our JPME. Changing the way war is waged, whether it is platforms and technology, concepts and policy, or people and organizations will require changes to educating and developing warfighters and strategists. “Transformation has intellectual, social and technological dimensions. Fundamental changes in the conceptualization of war as well as in organizational culture and behavior are usually required to bring it about.”⁵⁷

Transformation Pillars:

1. Strengthening joint operations through standing joint task force headquarters, improved joint command and control, joint training, and an expanded joint forces presence policy;
2. Experimenting with new approaches to warfare, operational concepts and capabilities, and organizational constructs such as standing joint forces through war gaming, simulations and field exercises focused on emerging challenges and opportunities;
3. Exploiting U.S. intelligence advantages through multiple intelligence collection assets, global surveillance and reconnaissance, and enhanced exploitation and dissemination; and
4. Developing transformational capabilities through increased and wide-ranging science and technology, selective increases in procurement, and innovations in DoD processes.⁵⁸

The overall requirement is to strengthen joint operations and to better meet future warfare challenges. “These joint forces will manage crises, forestall conflict, and conduct combat operations.”⁵⁹ Specifically in the Joint and Combined Command and Control Structure there is a “flexible, reliable, and effective joint command and control architecture that provides the flexibility to maneuver, sustain, and protect U.S. forces across the battlefield in a timely manner.”⁶⁰

“Such a joint command and control structure must reside not only at the joint command, but also down to the operational service components. The structure must be networked to ensure shared battle space awareness. In addition, the appropriate doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as a highly trained operational force must support the structure. Most important, it must develop and foster a joint professional culture, a requirement that presents a significant challenge to service and joint training and professional educations programs.”⁶¹

The DoD revitalization efforts address three outdated support structure areas where money can be saved and put towards a more capable fighting force. These areas are the facility infrastructure, financial systems, and business processes and regulations. In the area of

business practices and infrastructure, the PME Program and its support facilities are a vulnerable to changes in support of Transformation. DoD is charged to align, consolidate, or differentiate overlapping functions of the OSD, the Joint Staffs, and the Services. DoD will develop recommendations to eliminate redundancy. Additionally, to reduce waste and inefficiencies, facilities must be restructured to support multi-service missions. All military installations will be reviewed and recommendations will be based on the military value of the facilities and the structure of the force.

“Ensuring that the Joint Force is faster, more lethal, and flexible, requires interoperable Service and Defense Agency components. Interoperability does not imply identical pieces of equipment or systems, but rather that commanders are not constrained by technical, doctrinal, or cultural barriers between components and organizations. Real interoperability is more than simply deconflicting the activities of disparate organizations and forces. It requires optimizing all the capabilities and seamlessly interconnecting elements within the information domain as well as improvements in joint training and PME. The result is enhanced capabilities that magnify the strengths of the individual components. However, the nature of interoperability is changing. To achieve the levels of jointness described in the Joint Vision will require services to evolve in their approaches to integrating their capabilities within a joint operational framework. Consequently, more programs will have to be “born joint” – designed for joint operations – rather than “assembled ad hoc” from available Service components.⁶²

“The Joint Force must also be more fully integrated with other instruments of national power. The ability to operate with interagency, multinational, and commercial activities provides capabilities that enhance unity of effort and leverage the unique capabilities of each.⁶³

A critical capability listed in the National Military Strategy is the need for “quality people. The military must have quality people, in adequate numbers, who are properly trained and well led. They are fundamental to the employment of the capabilities of the Joint Force. The strength of the Joint Force has always rested on such people – disciplined, skilled, dedicated, professional, and well educated – more than advanced technology. They must be innovative and imaginative to meet the demands of “in stride” transformation.⁶⁴

“Executing the National Military Strategy will require a truly joint, full spectrum force – with a seamless mix of active forces, Reserve Components, and DoD civilians – that is fully grounded in culture of innovation. It will also require the highest quality people – disciplined, skilled, dedicated, professional, well trained, well educated, and well led.⁶⁵

ANALYSIS

The Senior Level Colleges were originally designed to focus on specific areas of concentration and to educate many officers, reaching a common level of strategic understanding within their service or specialty. The Army was to focus on land warfare, the Navy on naval warfare, the Air Force on aerospace, and ICAF on defense management and material acquisition. The National War College would focus on national security policy formulation. The original intent for the National WC was that its students would be former graduates of one of the Service colleges. This stopped very quickly when the Army and Marines decided they could no longer afford to send an officer for two years of study. Not since 1950 has this two year practice been routine. Now there remains a general adherence to the directed emphasis but an inequality in the basic level of JPME education and experience of the student body.

If the comments of the Skelton Panel of 1989 remain true about the need for strategists, “the objective of the JPME is not the creation of a large pool of military officers who are strategists on the order of Mahan, ... only a small number of genuine theoretical strategists are needed...more officers should become skilled in the application of strategy,⁶⁶ then those officers not already identified as demonstrating a talent and ability to develop theoretical strategic concepts of value to their service should indeed become better skilled in the application of strategy. There may be efficiencies gained if the two categories are once again separated. Both the Skelton and Cheney panels found the Armed Services PME to be adequate. JPME is the area in which schooling and job experience are either inadequate or waved too often.

The future application of strategy by the services in the transformed DoD will be in the joint environment. Given that the Cheney panel makes the intermediate level CGSC, which teaches Phase I of Joint Training a prerequisite for a JSO nomination and that most selectees to the senior level war colleges are all graduates of the intermediate level schools, why isn't the Phase II taught in conjunction with the senior level course? At the AWC, the FY03 class has only 41% JSO qualified officers. The remaining 59% arguably need Phase II Joint training.⁶⁷ When do the officers attend if not prior to the war colleges? After the war college a select few will only have one year to achieve this goal before Brigade Command. There is the aspiration for selection to General Officer/Flag Officer (GO/FO) which implies that joint training must be done earlier in their career. As a 2000 Secretary of Defense report reflects, the services are doing a poor job of joint training, assignment, and qualification in the senior ranks. “Some of the highest quality officers can and do successfully avoid joint duty until they are GO/FO selectees.

This is substantiated by the fact that over the past five years, 2000-1996, the Secretary of Defense has approved 401 waivers for newly promoted Brigadier Generals and Rear Admirals lower half. 93 which were Good of the Service (GoS) waivers for those with no previous joint duty during their careers. In the Army alone, 25 % of BG selectees over the last 3 years (2000, 1999, 1998) required GoS waivers.⁶⁸

"Per GAO-03-238, for most appointments to GO/FO level made after September 30, 2007, officers will have to meet the requirements expected of a JSO. In FY 2001, the Army promoted only 18 of 40 GOs meeting this requirement. DoD is required to promote JSO, as a group, at a rate not less than the rate for other officers in the same service, pay grade, and competitive category. Generally DoD meets this objective with a few exceptions. At the O6 level Navy has failed to meet the standard every year since FY 1988. The Army like the Navy has failed to meet the standard every year since 1988 except for FYs 1995 & 2001."⁶⁹

"GAO reporting of 124 GO/FO promoted in FY 2001 showed that 58 officers, or 47 percent, had not fulfilled the JSO requirements. These 58 officers included 18 of 43 – USAF, 18 of 40 – USA, 19 of 33 – USN, and 3 of 8 – USMC officers were promoted who were not joint qualified."⁷⁰ Combining this type promotion rate with the 2007 suspense for JSO qualifications will make promotion to GO/FO very difficult.

To address the finding of the Cheney Panel and to improve JPME, balancing the tensions of pushing joint training deeper into the PME and the need for more joint training at an earlier phase in an officer's development is increasingly critical. The growing emphasis on jointness earlier in PME is both necessary and inevitable. Given our growing optempo and increased number of joint, combined and multinational deployments in the recent past, young CPTs and MAJs are more than ever before supporting a joint staff. Waiting until they become LTCs and COLs is too late to prepare our leaders. Already many of these officers have two or three joint operational deployments to their credit. Waiting to attend the AFSC until after BN CMD will have the same effect as going to the Army's Combined Arms Service Staff School after serving three jobs on a division staff. It's ineffective.

Currently, the senior service schools enroll an approximate total number of 1,000 resident students combined. This is nearly equal to what the Army hosts at the Command and General Staff College on an annual basis. This common curriculum within designated learning areas and small amount of resident students per class begs the question of why are there five schools. Could the component emphasis be addressed at one location? Would the Armed Forces gain a better faculty to student ratio in the caliber required for accreditation? Would we become better "Joint" officers?

In my opinion, the answer to the questions above is “yes”. The composition of the current student body make up is not sufficient to truly bring dissenting viewpoints to the small group discussion. Class composition is not reflective of the joint staff organizations where most will eventually work.

OPTIONS

The following options have been made with a few assumptions which were not within the scope of the paper. The assumptions are as follows:

1. JSO qualification is very important to DoD and lack of it will negatively impact the services.
2. Services will not improve officer attendance at AFSC JPME Phase II prior to selection for Senior Service School.
3. JPME Phase II will be incorporated into SSC at all locations.
4. Initial capital investments are worth the long-term benefits.
5. Saving money is important for future Transformation initiatives.
6. The research laboratories and archives of each component school could function either independently or co-located with a consolidated Senior Service School.
7. Consolidate or co-locate the Marine Senior Service School class, which is the size of any other school's seminar, with one of the other service schools.
8. Small group instruction in the form of seminars will continue to be the standard learning environment.

OPTION ONE: VIRTUAL CO-LOCATION

Option one is to leave the physical structures and faculty of the senior level colleges at their current locations and make use of technology to routinely interact in an academic environment with students and faculty at the other service school locations. This will cause a greater focus on common studies and provide all joint officers the ability to gain a greater appreciation for each focus area of land, sea, air, and resources. It provides for a great possibility of utilizing the coveted civilian professors and doctorates with a greater audience. Guest speakers of one school can be heard at all schools thus sharing the experience and reducing the VIPs hectic schedule.

The senior service schools can gain tremendous educational benefits by incorporating the service specific school focus and faculty and student expertise together in a collaborative environment. Our services will fight in a collaborative environment using a relevant common operating picture and common database software. Students will gain immense knowledge and

expertise by solving problems, drafting and recommending COAs, negotiating positions, and observing commandant lecture series with sister service schools.

Many of our classrooms are already wired for video-teleconferencing (VTC). It is a matter of having the faculty coordinate appropriate lectures and core course material and exercises between the sister services. Students could gain a better perspective when addressing campaign strategies and service support if the expertise from air, land, and sea components could be exercise players and routine virtual classroom participants. Granted each service and national agency is represented in our current small groups, but they are not always of the right occupational skill set to provide first-hand knowledge or experience to the process. This broader student body allows all students to learn from the expanded experts.

Additionally, VTC provides the ability to bring classroom participants to the right mix to replicate the AFSC joint criteria for JSO training. Although the class would be within the spirit of the intent, they would not be housed together or play volleyball often. However, living in bachelor quarters is not as key as the classroom participation and the current SSC sports programs will fulfill any athletic requirement.

Option one improves overall JPME at the SSC level and provides for JSO training and official credit for classes that have not otherwise been completed. There is no disruption to current base or post facilities. It provides for the same current level of housing availability and via VTC, meets the classroom composition for JPME Phase II. There will be no disgruntled communities or state politicians.

However, the budgets may need to be increased to pay for air time and some equipment upgrades or modifications. However, this could be saved in TDY expenditures to AFSC. Further research is needed for the detailed cost analysis.

OPTION TWO: CONSOLIDATE

Option two is to consolidate the schools at one location. This accomplishes the same increased focus on common studies with additional benefits. It brings the composition of the student body more in line with the intent and spirit of equal representation from all services for JSO training. It makes all faculties available. Some of our nations best experts in military and national policy and strategy work at one of the other schools. Consolidation would bring the best together. Greater efficiencies can be gained in directed study areas. In addition to individual research projects, group projects could actually attempt to solve ongoing, or even real world Defense problems that the combatant commands and joint and service staffs do not have the dedicated resources to focus on the problem.

This move will allow DoD to close some facilities and reduce overhead and operating budgets. Most importantly, it will free monies to better implement defense transformation. Any one of the current facilities could expand to accommodate the increase of students. Of course additional cost benefit analysis is required to determine the best location. However, the numbers of students that each service sends to SSC is small enough to make the consolidation possible.

Option two like option one provides the best of student and faculty mix. It provides an opportunity to ensure the best of the best instructors stay on staff. It would immediately fill the requirement of student mix ratio for JSO training. It would close two major facilities and reduce expenditures. It would force cooperation among services to develop an institutional command and staff structure that supports all service component expertise while enhancing joint operational studies. It would bring the relevant common operating picture to the students daily.

An additional benefit would be for the spouses. Many are not exposed to the other services except for the few joint duty positions. Our new joint operations and the unique deployment and employment operations of the future will require greater joint support. This also applies to our families at these locations. This consolidated school environment will allow spouses to attend joint workshops to discuss unique family support requirements and propose possible solutions for the future. As the services become more joint so may our approach to family support.

A consolidated school environment at this level puts officers in a true "Joint" environment, at a point in their careers where considerable thought and study with the other services, can and will make a difference in how they execute their service missions in the future. Waiting until they pin GO/FO is too late. The Capstone course may well not be needed in its current configuration if a consolidated SSC is successful.

RECOMMENDATION

Trust and history together makes for a lasting friendship and service respect that will make joint operations in the future Armed Forces more effective and efficient. Nothing is a substitute for working, living, and playing together. For the future senior leaders of this nation, the best possible education is more important than parochialisms and the proverbial rice bowls we often read and hear about.

"The 1986 Congress' objective was nothing short of a change in the culture of the officers corps. Admiral Harry D. Train, II supported this objective by adding "jointness is a state of mine." And a former war college president added, "jointness is an acculturation process that

takes both time and emphasis.⁷¹ If the Services are to transform as an Armed Force, then leadership must look at interoperability and joint ventures at every opportunity starting with our education. The original JPME has been an excellent model. However, the President and Secretary of Defense urge and at times demand the services change their approaches quickly and determine our future warfighting structure and equipment. The services are to do this on the existing budget. Agreement in application begins with understanding and trust. As “Joint” was forced on the services in 1947, the time is right to willingly look at options to make us more strategically joint and interoperable.

Of the options presented, in my professional opinion, option two is the optimal choice. It gains more positive efficiency and potentially frees operating budget monies towards research, development, and fielding costs for “Joint” transformation. Consolidation of the service schools makes the most sense. Option one, is equally acceptable as an interim, but falls short of the great efficiency and effectiveness of option two.

Now is the time to place the proper emphasis on the senior leaders of the armed services in a way that affects our future in a transitioned DoD. Early acculturation is key to building trust and a lasting rapport from which we can continue to move forward. The National War College should once again focus on the task of training theoretical strategic leaders and send the majority of officers to a service school. Joint training and duty experience must be improved and the criteria for selection based on training and experience adhered to more regularly.

WORD COUNT = 9,065

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